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Reconciling Reconciliation: Differing Conceptions of the Supreme
Court of Canada and the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation
Commission
KIM STANTON
Cet article traite du concept de « réconciliation » tel qu’utilisé dans deux forums : la
Cour suprême du Canada (la Cour) et la Commission de vérité et de réconciliation
sur les répercussions des « pensionnats indiens » (CVR). Le développement du
concept dans la jurisprudence de la Cour, comparé à la littérature universitaire sur la
justice transitoire, mérite un examen soigné. La Cour a utilisé ce terme dans ses
décisions visant à contrebalancer les déclarations de souveraineté autochtone dans le
contexte du colonialisme canadien. Ce concept de réconciliation est par ailleurs bien
différent de celui qui s’est développé dans le discours canadien, grâce à la CVR.
L’auteur suggère que la vision de la réconciliation de la CVR, c’est-à-dire comme
processus mutuel dans lequel les peuples autochtones et non-autochtones doivent
s’engager, est un concept plus juste à adopter.
This paper considers the concept of "reconciliation" as it is utilized in two fora: the
Supreme Court of Canada (the Court) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
on the legacy of the “Indian residential schools” (TRC). The concept’s development
in the Court’s jurisprudence, as compared to the scholarly literature of transitional
justice, warrants careful consideration. The Court has used the term in decisions
seeking to balance assertions of Indigenous sovereignty in the context of Canadian
colonialism. However, this concept of reconciliation is quite different from that
which has entered Canadian discourse from the TRC. The author suggests that the
vision of reconciliation enunciated by the TRC as a mutual process to be engaged in
by Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples alike would be a more just conception to
adopt.

IN THIS PAPER, I CONSIDER THE CONCEPT OF “RECONCILIATION” as it is utilized in two
fora: the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
Canada (TRC) on the legacy of Indian Residential Schools.1 The concept’s development in the
SCC’s jurisprudence, as compared to its meaning in the scholarly literature of transitional justice,
warrants careful consideration. The SCC has used the term reconciliation in decisions seeking to
balance assertions of Indigenous sovereignty with assertions of sovereignty by the Canadian
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Fellow of Massey College. She previously practiced constitutional and Aboriginal law in British Columbia and
Ontario and is now the Legal Director of the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), a national
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1
I presented an initial version of this paper at a conference “Evaluating the Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Canada,” hosted by the Centre for Transitional Justice and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Western
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state.2 However, Canada has now seen itself reflected in the proceedings of the TRC. Truth
commissions are understood internationally to be mechanisms that assist states with addressing
periods of extreme societal rupture. These transitional justice mechanisms enable states to create
accurate historical records of such periods and make recommendations to prevent their
recurrence. In transitional justice parlance, reconciliation refers to “societal healing.”3 This
understanding of reconciliation is quite different from that which has entered Canadian legal
discourse. The SCC articulates reconciliation as a process flowing from the recognition of
Aboriginal rights in the Constitution Act, 1982. Unfortunately, the SCC’s version of
reconciliation is formed from the litigation process in a Canadian court system imposed upon
Indigenous peoples, which uses colonial precepts and terminology that precludes genuine
reconciliation.
In this paper, I provide an overview of the concept of reconciliation as it has developed in
Canada since 1990, first by a royal commission, then the SCC, and finally by the TRC. I note the
framework for reconciliation advanced by the TRC, and I suggest that its vision of reconciliation
as a mutual process to be engaged in by Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples alike would be a
more just conception to adopt than that enunciated by the SCC.

I. RECONCILIATION IN CANADA
In the 1990s, the term “reconciliation” began to appear in Canadian discourse with respect to
Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations in both jurisprudence and in the language of public
inquiries. A particularly important enunciation of the concept is found in one of Canada’s
landmark reports on Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations, the report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP).

A. THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES
The Oka crisis prompted the 1991 establishment of a national commission of inquiry to address
the glaring gulf between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples that the confrontation in
Mohawk territory south of Montreal had brought to the national consciousness. Though its
recommendations were largely ignored by the federal government of the day, RCAP continues to
provide this country’s most comprehensive review of the historical, social, cultural, economic,
and political circumstances of Indigenous peoples. It is critical reading for anyone who wishes to
better understand the broken relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in
what is now called Canada.
The Commission’s proceedings spanned five years, and included 178 days of public
hearings in 96 communities. Many of those who testified before the Commission were survivors
of residential schools, which had been run by the Canadian government and churches for a
period spanning more than a century. Indeed, the last school did not close until the year RCAP
released its report in 1996. It was the first major inquiry to report on residential schools in a
comprehensive way. Devoting an entire chapter to the topic, RCAP recommended a public
inquiry be held specifically on residential schools:
2

See discussions below regarding the Supreme Court’s decisions in Van der Peet, Delgamuukw, and Haida Nation.
Priscilla B Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001) at
133 [Hayner].

3
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No segment of our research aroused more outrage and shame than the story of the
residential schools … . A public inquiry is urgently required to examine the origins,
purposes and effects of residential school policies, to identify abuses, to recommend
remedial measures and to begin the process of healing.4
RCAP’s purpose has been described thus: “The over-arching task of the Royal
Commission was to help restore justice in the relationship between Aboriginal and nonAboriginal people. It was believed that harmony can only emulate from a spirit of justice.”5
Further:
The commissioners themselves stated that fundamental change will only occur if the
Canadian government and Canadians understand that Aboriginal people are nations;
that is, that they are political and cultural groups with values and life-ways distinct
from those of other Canadians … . This is something that cannot be accomplished
through a document. Rather, it must be accomplished by educating Canadian citizens
and fostering dialogue among governments and Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
citizens.6
As noted in the TRC’s interim report: “RCAP’s guiding principles of mutual recognition,
mutual respect, sharing and mutual responsibility are critical to any reconciliation process.”7
Justice René Dussault, Co-Chair of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, stated: “First
and foremost, reconciliation is a matter of trust.”8 That trust would be built through a
reformulation of the political structure of Canada. As Asch noted, RCAP “eschewed the terra
nullius thesis … RCAP asserted that resolution to the question of the political status of the
parties would be achieved through mutual recognition that both Canada and Indigenous peoples
hold sovereignty today.”9 Further, “[RCAP] favoured political solutions because of the
uncertainty involved in litigation.”10 Needless to say, the RCAP approach has not been adopted
in any meaningful way by successive Canadian governments, though RCAP laid the groundwork
for the TRC by bringing the experience of survivors to the national consciousness, and setting
out the terrible intention, structure and operation of the residential schools as undeniable factual
truths. However, it would be another two decades after the release of RCAP’s report before the
TRC’s inauguration. The lack of an adequate political response to RCAP’s report prompted the
survivors of the schools to turn to legal responses. Criminal prosecutions, civil suits, alternative
4

The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1996) , Vol. 1, Part 2, Chapter 13 [RCAP Report].
5
Bradford W Morse & Tanya M Kozak, “Gathering Strength: The Government of Canada’s Response to the Final
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples” in Aboriginal Rights Coalition, Blind Spots: An
Examination of the Federal Government's Response to the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
(Ottawa: Aboriginal Rights Coalition, 2001) at 33 [Blind Spots].
6
Ibid at 35.
7
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: Interim Report, (Winnipeg: TRC, 2012) at 24.
8
René Dussault, “Indigenous Peoples and Child Welfare: The Path to Reconciliation.” (2007) 3 First Peoples Child
& Family Review 3 at 10.
9
Michael Asch “From Terra Nullius to Affirmation: Reconciling Aboriginal Rights with the Canadian Constitution”
(2002) 17 Can LJ & Society 23 at 35.
10
David Stack “The Impact of RCAP on the Judiciary: Bringing Aboriginal Perspectives into the Courtroom”
(1999), 62 Sask L Rev 471 at para 90 [Stack].
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dispute resolution processes and class action lawsuits eventually led to the Indian Residential
Schools Settlement Agreement, a part of which provided for the formation of the TRC.11
As Brant Castellano recalls, RCAP’s report observed that in the search for reconciliation
between peoples, it is critical for public institutions to take the lead in adopting a more respectful
stance.12 Leadership is necessary from our major institutions and this must certainly include the
courts. One of the panel members charged with determining RCAP’s terms of reference was
former Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice Brian Dickson. In 1990 Dickson CJ penned the
decision in R v Sparrow,13 the SCC’s first discussion of reconciliation. Yet RCAP’s
understanding of the limits of judicial processes in effecting societal change is evident in its
report. RCAP provided some keen analysis of the courts’ jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights and
foregrounded later SCC jurisprudence on the duty to consult and the language of reconciliation:
Whenever governments intend to exercise their constitutional powers to legislate or
make policies that may affect Aboriginal peoples in a material way… they would be
wise to engage first in a process of consultation … .
There is no further need, if indeed there was ever a need, for unilateral government
action. The treaty is still Aboriginal peoples’ preferred model … .
The role of the courts is limited in significant ways. They develop the law of
Aboriginal and treaty rights on the basis of a particular set of facts before them in a
case. They cannot design an entire legislative scheme to implement self-government.
Courts must function within the parameters of existing constitutional structures; they
cannot innovate or accommodate outside these structures. They are also bound by the
doctrine of precedent to apply principles enunciated in earlier cases in which
Aboriginal peoples had no representation and their voices were not heard. For these
reasons courts can become unwitting instruments of division rather than instruments
of reconciliation … .
Participation in the courts requires Aboriginal people to plead their cases as
petitioners in a forum of adversaries established under Canadian law.14
Nonetheless, over the last half century since it became legal for Indigenous peoples to hire
lawyers to represent them,15 the courts have been an important venue for the assertion of
Indigenous rights in Canada.
11

See Kim Stanton “Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Settling the Past?” (2011) 2:3 International
Indigenous Policy Journal, online: <ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/2/> [perma.cc/F9EH-MY9R].
12
Marlene Brant Castellano, “Renewing the Relationship: A Perspective on the Impact of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples” in Aboriginal Rights Coalition, Blind Spots, supra note 5 at 12. Marlene was RCAP’s codirector of research.
13
R v Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 1075.
14
RCAP Report, supra note 4, Vol. 1, Introduction, “Opening the Door”
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071124125216/http://www.aincinac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sg1_e.html#0>.
15
The Indian Act was amended in 1926 to make it illegal for a lawyer to received fees to represent an Indian or a
band to commence claims against the Crown. See Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal
People: A C Hamilton & Murray Sinclair, Commissioners, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba
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B. THE SUPREME COURT’S CONCEPTION OF RECONCILIATION
The SCC has now presided over several decades of litigation regarding Aboriginal rights and
title—such cases as White and Bob, Calder, Guerin, and Sparrow are now part of the Canadian
legal canon.16 Walters credits RCAP with having “reintroduced reconciliation into Canadian
political discourse,”17 since the Court’s use of “reconciliation” in the Van der Peet trilogy of
decisions coincided with the release of the 1996 report. However, as noted above, the Court’s
first discussion of reconciliation came in the Sparrow decision in 1990. McNeil asserts that:
The notion of reconciliation as a legal concept affecting the relationship between the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada and the Crown appears to have originated with
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights by s.35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. In its first decision interpreting and applying s. 35(1), the
Supreme Court of Canada, in the unanimous judgment delivered by Dickson CJ and
LaForest J in Sparrow, said this:
There is no explicit language in the provision that authorizes this Court or any
court to assess the legitimacy of any government legislation that restricts
Aboriginal rights. Yet, we find that the words “recognition and affirmation”
incorporate the fiduciary relationship referred to earlier and so import some
restraint on the exercise of sovereign power. Rights that are recognized and
affirmed are not absolute. Federal legislative powers continue, including, of
course, the right to legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s.91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867. These powers must, however, now be read together
with s.35(1). In other words, federal power must be reconciled with federal
duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the
justification of any government regulation that infringes upon or denies
Aboriginal rights.18
The SCC then enunciated what is known as the Sparrow test for justification of
infringement of Aboriginal rights, requiring the federal government to prove both a valid
legislative objective and respect for the Crown’s fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples.
McNeil notes: “The concept of reconciliation that the Supreme Court had in mind in Sparrow
therefore seems to relate to the impact of constitutional recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal
and treaty rights on the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada.”19
(Winnipeg: Province of Manitoba, 1991) at 70. Between 1927 and 1951 the Indian Act prohibited the soliciting of
funds to advance “Indian claims” of any kind without official permission.
16
R v White and Bob (1964), 50 DLR (2d) 613 (BCCA); aff'd (1965), 52 DLR (2d) 481 (SCC); Calder v British
Columbia (Attorney-General), [1973] SCR 313; Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335; Sparrow, supra note 13.
17
Mark D Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” in Will Kymlicka & Bashir
Bashir, eds, The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 165 at
176 [Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation”].
18
Kent McNeil, “Reconciliation and the Supreme Court: The Opposing Views of Chief Justices Lamer and
McLachlin” (2003) 2:1 Indigenous LJ 1 at 2 [emphasis McNeil’s] [McNeil]. Section 35 recognizes and affirms the
“existing [A]boriginal and treaty rights of the [Aboriginal] peoples of Canada.”
19
Ibid.

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2017

25

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 26 [2017], Art. 2

A trilogy of cases related to Aboriginal commercial rights contained the SCC’s next
major use of the concept of reconciliation.20 Dickson CJ had retired from the Court in 1990 and
in Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer discussed the purpose of the recognition of Aboriginal and
treaty rights in the Constitution:
[W]hat s. 35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through which the fact
that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own practices,
traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty of the
Crown. The substantive rights which fall within the provision must be defined in
light of this purpose; the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must
be directed towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies
with the sovereignty of the Crown.21
Barsh and Henderson refer to the SCC’s conception of reconciliation in Van der Peet as a
“doctrine plucked from thin air.”22 Despite RCAP issuing two reports the year before on the
nature of the Crown-Aboriginal relationship, which spoke in terms of “partnership” and “coexistence,” they note that the Chief Justice did not refer to RCAP’s views on the matter. They
conclude: “The Van der Peet test entrenches European paternalism because the courts of the
colonizer have assumed the authority to define the nature and meaning of Aboriginal cultures.” 23
The dissent of Justice McLachlin and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Van der Peet found that Lamer
CJ’s interpretation was too narrow and that the constitutional nature of Aboriginal rights requires
that they be construed broadly.24 Chief Justice Lamer’s interpretation departed from the more
generous interpretation of section 35 established in Sparrow.
The next landmark Aboriginal rights case, Delgamuukw, wended its way through the courts
for thirteen years until the Supreme Court’s decision in 1997.25 This was a legal claim for
ownership and self-governance over 58,000 square kilometres of land in British Columbia. The
SCC’s judgment addressed Aboriginal title but did not allocate ownership. Instead, it called for a
new trial, as noted in Lamer CJ’s iconic passage:
By ordering a new trial, I do not necessarily encourage the parties to proceed to
litigation and settle their dispute through the courts … . Ultimately it is through
negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides, reinforced by
the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve … the reconciliation of the preexistence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown. Let us face it, we
are all here to stay.26
This is a continuation of the view expressed in R v Gladstone in 1996 by the Chief Justice
that the Crown is sovereign over all of Canada:
20

R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 [Van der Peet]. The other two cases were R v NTC Smokehouse Ltd., [1996]
2 SCR 672 and R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 [Gladstone].
21
Ibid, Van der Peet, at para 31.
22
Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, “The Supreme Court’s Van der Peet Trilogy: Naïve
Imperialism and Ropes of Sand” (1997) 42 McGill LJ 993 at 999.
23
Ibid at 1002.
24
Van der Peet, per McLachlin J at para 231ff; and per L’Heureux-Dubé J at para 142ff.
25
Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw].
26
Ibid at para 186.
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Aboriginal rights are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) in order to reconcile the
existence of distinctive aboriginal societies prior to the arrival of Europeans in North
America with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over that territory; they are the means
by which the critical and integral aspects of those societies are maintained. Because,
however, distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader social,
political and economic community, over which the Crown is sovereign, there are
circumstances in which, in order to pursue objectives of compelling and substantial
importance to that community as a whole (taking into account the fact that aboriginal
societies are a part of that community), some limitation of those rights will be
justifiable. Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the reconciliation of aboriginal
societies with the broader political community of which they are part; limits placed on
those rights are, where the objectives furthered by those limits are of sufficient
importance to the broader community as a whole, equally a necessary part of that
reconciliation.27
Of course this approach does not account for self-determination of Indigenous peoples.
Indeed the Chief Justice stated in Delgamuukw:
The broad nature of the claim at trial also led to a failure by the parties to address
many of the difficult conceptual issues which surround the recognition of aboriginal
self-government. The degree of complexity involved can be gleaned from the Report
of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which devotes 277 pages to the
issue. That report describes different models of self-government, each differing with
respect to their conception of territory, citizenship, jurisdiction, internal government
organization, etc. We received little in the way of submissions that would help us to
grapple with these difficult and central issues. Without assistance from the parties, it
would be imprudent for the Court to step into the breach. In these circumstances, the
issue of self-government will fall to be determined at trial.28
To some degree, this failure of the parties to provide the Court with submissions on selfgovernment simply illustrates the broader societal failure to address the central question of
Indigenous sovereignty. If a broader dialogue and recognition of sovereignty were to permeate
and prevail in discussions of title between the Crown and Indigenous nations, then the
submissions in any given case would likely reflect that acknowledgement. Unfortunately, the
colonial narrative has persisted for so long in Canadian legal institutions that it has often
obscured the real parameters of claims. Indigenous peoples are not seeking “Aboriginal title” and
“self-government”; they are seeking Canadian legal recognition as peoples on their own territory,
over which they are entitled to govern. They do so because Canadian governments and
companies will not recognize the Indigenous laws in place governing those territories. Without
this context, judges are operating on a set of principles that will always produce an unsatisfactory
outcome. The courts’ version of reconciliation will necessarily be lacking in depth and, critically,
truth.

27
28

Gladstone, supra note 20 at para 73[emphasis in original].
Delgamuukw, supra note 25 at para 171.
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It is notable that Lamer CJ references the work of RCAP in Delgamuukw yet chooses not
to rely upon it as evidence. While the RCAP report relied upon exhaustive evidence from
testimony and scholarly research, like many royal commissions, its conclusions are not
uniformly accepted as factual evidence in courts of law. Without a doubt, the TRC’s report will
similarly be challenged as evidence by litigants who wish to prevent its conclusions from gaining
traction in court. Stack notes that various courts have struggled with whether to view RCAP’s
findings as evidence or as authority. Certainly Crown counsel have argued the latter.29 While
noting that Justice Abella readily accepted RCAP’s conclusions in her dissenting judgment on a
residential schools case,30 Stack observed that:
In contrast, the British Columbia Supreme Court in F.A. v. Henley found the Report
to be inadmissible. The Court found that “the Report cannot be admitted to prove the
truth of any conclusions stated by the Commission.” The Court also ruled that the
facts which the Report purportedly established were not beyond controversy.31
Even where RCAP’s work is adopted by the courts, the interpretation applied to it is
sometimes discouraging. Justice Binnie’s concurring judgment in Mitchell v MNR relies upon
RCAP’s concept of “merged sovereignty”:
The modern embodiment of the “two-row” wampum concept, modified to reflect
some of the realities of a modern state, is the idea of a “merged” or “shared”
sovereignty. “Merged sovereignty” asserts that First Nations were not wholly
subordinated to non-aboriginal sovereignty but over time became merger partners. …
If the principle of “merged sovereignty” articulated by the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples is to have any true meaning, it must include at least the idea that
aboriginal and non-aboriginal Canadians together form a sovereign entity with a
measure of common purpose and united effort. It is this new entity, as inheritor of the
historical attributes of sovereignty, with which existing aboriginal and treaty rights
must be reconciled.32
It is clear that Binnie J read the RCAP report and was influenced by its conclusions.33 However,
his reading of reconciliation still cleaves to the notion that Indigenous peoples must reconcile
themselves to a loss of sovereignty. He relies upon RCAP’s historical review to reject the
assertion of Mohawk autonomy within “the broader framework of Canadian sovereignty.”34
The RCAP report is in fact referenced in various court decisions, including
Delgamuukw, but the SCC’s conception of reconciliation remains at odds with that expressed in
RCAP. As noted by Borrows, “[f]or the Court, colonialism is a justifiable infringement of
Aboriginal title,” but, “[c]alling colonization ‘infringement’ is an immense understatement.”35
29

Stack, supra note 10 at para 29.
Ibidat para 30, citing EB v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate in the Province of British Columbia 2005
SCC 60 at paras 72–73.
31
Ibid at para 30, citing Aksidan et al v Henley et al 2006 BCSC 1008 per Halfyard J at para 57, footnotes omitted.
32
Mitchell v MNR 2001 SCC 33, Binnie J, at paras 129–130 [Mitchell].
33
He also cites the RCAP Report in McDiarmid Lumber v God’s Lake First Nation 2006 SCC 58 at various points
in his dissenting reasons.
34
Mitchell, supra note 32 at para 113.
35
John Borrows, “Aboriginal Peoples After RCAP” (2001) 46 McGill LJ 615 at 648.
30
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Indeed, according to Borrows, “[c]ourts have read Aboriginal rights to lands and resources as
requiring a reconciliation that asks much more of Aboriginal peoples than it does of Canadians.
Reconciliation should not be a front for assimilation.”36
The approach to reconciliation articulated by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw is referred to by
Walters as “a one-sided or mechanical way or as just another way of balancing competing
interests.”37 However, this concept of reconciliation became woven into further SCC judgments
in the ensuing years.38 While according to Jung: “the Supreme Court has interpreted
reconciliation as an obligation to reconcile Canadian and aboriginal legal systems,”39 this is
perhaps too generous a view of the Court’s decision in Delgamuukw. Rather, the SCC saw
reconciliation as a process of recognizing that Indigenous societies pre-existed Crown
sovereignty, while simultaneously subjecting their rights to limits that make them consistent with
the goals of the larger Canadian society of which they are now a part.
Despite Jung’s suggestion that the Court’s conception of reconciliation as enunciated in
Delgamuukw should be imported into the transitional justice framework, there is much in these
decisions that warrants caution.40 The later “duty to consult” cases such as Haida Nation v
British Columbia (Minister of Forests) and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia
(Project Assessment Director)41 provide a more positive approach to reconciliation insofar as
they seem to suggest that it is not simply Indigenous peoples that must reconcile themselves to
the assertion of Crown sovereignty, but rather that Crown sovereignty may not be legitimate
unless the Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in question have made a treaty.42
A shift is evident in these duty to consult cases (i.e., Haida Nation and Taku River); now
Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin describes reconciliation as a process flowing from section 35
rights. Under her leadership, the Supreme Court developed the concept of the honour of the
Crown and deepened the government’s duty to consult with First Nations about land use in their
traditional territories. In Haida Nation, the Crown argued that there is no legal duty to consult or
accommodate a First Nation with respect to land use until the scope and content of their
Aboriginal title is finally determined. This approach would allow the Crown to draw out at

36

Ibid at 660–661.
Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation,” supra note 17 at 190.
38
This jurisprudence has been well-documented by others and will not be reviewed here. See McNeil, supra note 18
and D’Arcy Vermette “Dizzying Dialogue: Canadian Courts and the Continuing Justification of the Dispossession
of Aboriginal Peoples” (2011) 29 Windsor YB Access Just 55.
39
Courtney Jung, “Canada and the Legacy of the Indian Residential Schools: Transitional Justice for Indigenous
Peoples in a Non-Transitional Society” Social Science Research Network (8 April 2009), online:
<ssrn.com/abstract=1374950> at 23 [perma.cc/99W3-SS9H].
40
Ibid at 23. See Delgamuukw, supra note 25 at para 165. For a thoughtful analysis of the Court’s conception of
section 35 rights and the limits of its approach to reconciliation, see Minnawaanagogiizhigook (Dawnis Kennedy),
“Reconciliation without Respect? Section 35 and Indigenous Legal Orders” in Law Commission of Canada,
Indigenous Legal Traditions (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).
41
Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 [Haida Nation]; Taku River Tlingit First
Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74 [Taku River].
42
See Mark D Walters, “The Morality of Aboriginal Law” (2006) 31 Queen’s LJ 470 [Walters, “The Morality of
Aboriginal Law”] at 501 and Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation,” supra note 17 at 178. See also Brian
Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85:2 Can Bar Rev 255 at 282 in which he proposes
“Principles of Reconciliation” that “posit that historical aboriginal title has been transformed into a generative right,
which can be partially implemented by the courts but whose full implementation requires the negotiation of modern
treaties.” And see Brian Slattery’s influential argument on the Court’s developing jurisprudence on Aboriginal title,
“The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights,” (2007) 38:2 Supreme Court Law Review 595.
37
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length the legal process to determine Aboriginal title. This argument was rejected by the Court in
a unanimous judgment delivered by McLachlin CJ:
[T]he duty to consult and accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and
reconciliation that begins with the assertion of sovereignty and continues beyond
formal claims resolution. Reconciliation is not a final legal remedy in the usual
sense. Rather, it is a process flowing from rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. This process of reconciliation flows from the Crown’s duty
of honourable dealing toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn from the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of
land and resources that were formerly in the control of that people.43
This shift from Lamer CJ’s enunciation of justifiable infringement in Delgamuukw to a
greater preference for negotiated solutions44 is encouraging. Yet this formulation of
reconciliation is still problematic—while it is of course a process, the Court inherently accepts
the legitimacy of the initial assertion of sovereignty by the Crown, which seems to boil down to
the idea that “yes, we are taking your land, but fairly.”45
I have previously suggested that if the concept of reconciliation found in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence were to inform the TRC process in any way, it is the approach found in
these later cases, emphasizing elements of respect, mutuality, and reciprocity, which would be a
more fruitful basis for discussions of reconciliation.46 Walters suggests that this form of
“reconciliation through negotiation” is “about establishing the legal and moral authority of the
Canadian state.”47
Although there has been a shift over time in the Court’s approach to Aboriginal title and
changes in Chief Justices from Dickson to Lamer to McLachlin, the Court’s jurisprudence with
respect to reconciliation remains fundamentally problematic given its basis in an assumption of
Crown sovereignty.48 However, can the courts be expected to provide a robust roadmap for
reconciliation when the broader Canadian society continues to invest in a colonial narrative that
suggests that Canada legitimately exerted sovereignty and that Indigenous peoples should rightly
be subsumed under Canada’s domain? As noted by Land:
Justice in the courts has not resulted in political changes. Five years after [RCAP’s]
report and four years after the landmark Delgamuukw decision on Aboriginal title,
government policy on Aboriginal land rights has not changed in any significant way
… .
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There remains a deep denial in Canadian society about the historic and contemporary
systematic destruction of Aboriginal peoples and cultures in this land. After five
hundred years, we still live a lie in Canadian society. We try to remain willfully
oblivious to the destruction of Aboriginal communities. We still maintain that these
issues are someone else’s responsibility and have nothing to do with us. …
Confronting what has been called “Canada’s original sin”—the devastating impact of
colonization, historically, and currently—is a litmus test of the Canadian public’s
commitment to just relationships.49
Nonetheless, the SCC continues to make decisions that walk the difficult line between
acknowledgement of Aboriginal and treaty rights and acceptance of Crown sovereignty, more
recently in its decision in Tsilhqot’in.
1. THE TSILHQOT’IN DECISION
In Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, the SCC affirms a trial decision that engaged with
considerable effort in a discussion of reconciliation. The preference expressed by both RCAP
and the Court for negotiated settlements is picked up by Justice Vickers in the trial decision in
Tsilhqot’in. The entire concluding section of his 2007 decision focuses on reconciliation and
implores the parties to negotiate a settlement rather than continue to an appeal.50 Justice Vickers
expressed considerable angst about the fact that the court process simply cannot do justice and
urged the parties to negotiate:
Throughout the course of the trial and over the long months of preparing this
judgment, my consistent hope has been that, whatever the outcome, it would
ultimately lead to an early and honourable reconciliation with Tsilhqot’in people.
After a trial of this scope and duration, it would be tragic if reconciliation with
Tsilhqot’in people were postponed through seemingly endless appeals. The time to
reach an honourable resolution and reconciliation is with us today.51
McNeil’s analysis of Vickers J’s decision identifies the perplexing situation that judges
find themselves in when required to adjudicate assertions of sovereignty, or “land claims” after
governments have failed to negotiate treaties:
The “invidious position” courts have been placed in as a result of these failures is
this: when claims such as this come to court, judges are faced with the task of trying
to achieve reconciliation of the competing interests … but are unable to do so, given
the constraints of the law and the inappropriate adversarial context in which judges
are obliged to make their decisions.52
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Justice Vickers made it clear to the parties that his purpose in setting out in considerable
detail his views on factual matters (that he did not strictly speaking need to provide) was to
“force Canada and British Columbia to modify their views on Aboriginal title, and push the
parties into honourable negotiations that would result in genuine reconciliation, a goal
unattainable in court.”53 Despite this exhortation, the case made its way to the SCC. Chief Justice
McLachlin penned the Court’s unanimous decision in Tsilhqot’in.54 She noted that:
The Court in Delgamuukw confirmed that infringements of Aboriginal title can be
justified under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 pursuant to the Sparrow test and
described this as a “necessary part of the reconciliation of [A]boriginal societies with
the broader political community of which they are part.”55
She recounted the Court’s application of Delgamuukw in Haida Nation, noting that: “The Court
in Haida stated that the Crown had not only a moral duty, but a legal duty to negotiate in good
faith to resolve land claims … . The governing ethos is not one of competing interests but of
reconciliation.”56 However, as McNeil notes, the Haida and Tsilhqot’in decisions contain a
contradiction: “The pre-existing sovereignty of the Indigenous nations is acknowledged, and yet
the Crown in some sense was able to acquire sovereignty over them and their territories
unilaterally by discovery or assertion.”57 Indeed, McNeil acknowledges that Indigenous scholars
Tracey Lindberg and Felix Hoehn have demonstrated that “Canadian law faces a crisis over the
unresolved tension between pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty and asserted Crown
sovereignty.”58
Despite the “courageous” shift that McLachlin CJ initiates in Tsilhqot’in,59 the colonial
narrative is difficult to escape—assertions of sovereignty are characterized as “land claims”
which suggests that they are merely unproven allegations, thus ascribing a character to the
Indigenous position from the outset, even in this decision that sent shudders through resource
extraction companies and their legal counsel. References to “pre-sovereignty Aboriginal
interests”60 further reveal the difficulty in avoiding this colonial narrative. Discussing this basic
issue of framing and language in terms of their outflow from colonialism is perhaps viewed as
radical in mainstream Canadian legal circles, but it is a necessary conversation if we are sincere
about reconciliation, however conceived. We simply cannot fail to interrogate the assumptions
implicit in the language used in the courts to address these cases that arise out of fundamentally
different views of how this country was formed, how it has prospered, and how we can proceed
in a just way.
53
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Notwithstanding the difficulties implicit in the terminology regularly used by litigants,
there is some hope to be found in the Chief Justice’s view that defects in the pleadings in such
cases should not bar the claim:
… cases such as this require an approach that results in decisions based on the best
evidence that emerges, not what a lawyer may have envisaged when drafting the
initial claim. What is at stake is nothing less than justice for the Aboriginal group and
its descendants, and the reconciliation between the group and broader society. A
technical approach to pleadings would serve neither goal. It is in the broader public
interest that land claims and rights issues be resolved in a way that reflects the
substance of the matter. Only thus can the project of reconciliation this Court spoke
of in Delgamuukw be achieved.61
The SCC does firmly reject the applicability of the doctrine of terra nullius in what is
now Canada, but simply accepts that the Crown has “underlying” title, while acknowledging that
this title is “burdened” by an Aboriginal interest in land.62 The Court uses the concept of
reconciliation as a way to bridge the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies in what is now Canada
with the reality of the Canadian state’s assertion of sovereignty.63 As in its previous decisions,
particularly Delgamuukw, the SCC in Tsilhqot’in notes that the government can encroach upon
Aboriginal title if there is a public interest reason for doing so, stating that this is “a process of
reconciling Aboriginal interests with the broader public interests under s. 35.”64 This of course
ignores the public interest of Indigenous peoples, which in this era of pipeline expansion,
fracking, and other resource extraction is increasingly arguably converging with the interests of
non-Indigenous peoples in protecting the water, land, and air for future generations.
The Chief Justice does state that: “Whether a particular use is irreconcilable with the
ability of succeeding generations to benefit from the land will be a matter to be determined when
the issue arises.”65 However, this presumes equal ability to assert and defend sovereignty when
the government likely holds much more of the power than any First Nation in any given court
battle. Although the Crown has a procedural duty to consult prior to carrying out an action
contrary to a people’s right to Aboriginal title, the efficacy of efforts to consult are varied and
frequently inadequate, and it requires resources to challenge the Crown’s actions. Many First
Nations lack the resources to make such challenges.66 Furthermore, the Court’s unconscious use
of a variant of the term “reconciliation” in its use of the word “irreconcilable” here suggests that
the real conflict underlying the reconciliation debate is what use is each side going to make of
the land, and which use is going to benefit more people? This insight into the underlying
motivation for discussing reconciliation makes it all the more important to insert into the notion
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of “public interest” that there is independent value in respecting the self-determination of
Indigenous peoples, sometimes at a fairly high monetary cost.67
The Court’s discussion of section 35 in the Tsilhqot’in decision is noteworthy for its
return to the Sparrow decision:
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 represents “the culmination of a long and
difficult struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the constitutional
recognition of [A]boriginal rights”… . It protects Aboriginal rights against provincial
and federal legislative power and provides a framework to facilitate negotiations and
reconciliation of Aboriginal interests with those of the broader public.68
The framework for analysis in Sparrow is at least closer to a just vision of how we might
proceed. However, the Court’s jurisprudence since Sparrow has enabled considerable incursions
into the Aboriginal rights deemed to be “existing,” particularly those enunciated by Lamer CJ in
Delgamuukw. Although McLachlin CJ for the Court in Tsilhqot’in states that the limits imposed
by section 35 on governments “protect Aboriginal and treaty rights while also allowing the
reconciliation of Aboriginal interests with those of broader society,”69 in practice this comes
about only after protracted legal struggles and enormous expenditure of resources.

C. THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
The Court’s conception of reconciliation is completely different from that of the TRC. The
reconciliation process has been (appropriately) framed by the TRC as a mutual process to be
engaged in by Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples alike; it cannot be a one-sided process.
One commentator notes that reconciliation on a national level must be at least in part a political
process that includes acknowledgement of political and legal rights of Indigenous peoples.70 The
concept of reconciliation is a bit amorphous, in no small part because it will mean different
things to different people. In the transitional justice literature, the concept of reconciliation refers
to repairing “torn relationships between ethnic, religious, regional, or political groups, between
neighbours, and between political communities. In short, societal healing.”71
Regan notes that while in Australia reconciliation has been a social movement, in Canada
it has largely been a legal remedy,72 primarily concerned with reconciling Aboriginal and Crown
land title. Since the inauguration of the TRC in Canada there has arguably been some change in
this assessment. The TRC process, particularly toward the end of its mandate in 2015, gathered
momentum in some Canadian and Indigenous communities, as evidenced by marches in
Vancouver and Ottawa that attracted thousands of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.
67
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The TRC could not reasonably be expected to reconcile on its own the entire relationship
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada. On the face of it, the TRC’s
mandate was limited to creating a historical record of the residential schools system and
educating the public about the residential schools legacy. As Llewellyn has observed, the TRC’s
mandate did not provide much detail with respect to the reconciliation aspect of its work.73 The
mandate refers to healing the relationship between peoples:
Reconciliation is an ongoing individual and collective process, and will require
commitment from all those affected including First Nations, Inuit and Métis former
Indian Residential School (residential schools) students, their families, communities,
religious entities, former school employees, government and the people of Canada.74
Even the opening line to the preamble to Schedule N, the TRC’s terms of reference,
suggests this idea that the government would simply like to close the door on the past and move
on: “There is an emerging and compelling desire to put the events of the past behind us.”75 This
approach leaves us in danger of repeating the travesty of the policy that brought about the
residential schools legacy in the first place—the desire to get to a point where there is no Indian
question.76
The means of reconciliation as envisioned by the TRC include truth telling,
acknowledgement of past wrongs, reparations for the victims, addressing the structural causes of
the wrongs, and a rebalancing between societal groups to prevent the harms from recurring.
When he was Lieutenant Governor of Ontario, James Bartleman, warned that unless Canadian
society as a whole signals that it is serious about according equal economic and social rights to
Indigenous Canadians, the TRC’s Commissioners will find that “they have been shod with shoes
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of clay. There can be no true reconciliation and Canada cannot claim it is a just and equal society
unless economic and social equality is accorded to Aboriginal people.”77
The apology from Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2008 was a critically
important step for survivors and for bringing the residential schools legacy to the attention of
Canadians, but it was only a step.78 The national leadership on this issue must continue in a
visible way. During the course of the TRC’s mandate, such leadership was seriously lacking
from the government side, as highlighted by the government’s refusal to provide documents to
the TRC and forcing the TRC to expend resources in going to court to obtain orders for
production of the documents.79 The TRC had an inspiring and extraordinary leader in Chief
Commissioner Murray Sinclair, and the TRC produced powerful recommendations,80 but without
ongoing leadership from other major institutions in Canada, reconciliation will remain elusive.
The Harper government provided a lacklustre response to the TRC’s interim report. In
contrast, the government of Justin Trudeau was elected in 2015 on a platform that included a
promise to implement the TRC’s Calls to Action.81 It was the Trudeau government that received
the final report in December 2015, declaring its intention to implement the Calls to Action that
relate to the federal government and to establish a nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous
peoples.82 While the Trudeau government’s approach marked a departure from that of the Harper
government, to date, their adherence to the initial bold intentions has been uneven, and there
remains a long way to go before the nation-to-nation relationship discussed in the RCAP report
becomes a reality.83
Aside from the frustrations of the lack of a political response to the residential schools
legacy and the dissatisfaction with the other legal mechanisms available, a further reason that
survivors sought a truth commission in the residential schools negotiations was the widespread
ignorance amongst non-Indigenous Canadians about the residential schools system and its
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profound and continuing effect on Indigenous communities.84 The advantage of a truth
commission for combatting such ignorance is the ability to create an incontrovertible historical
record and enable significant public education.85 The TRC was tasked with creating a record of
the residential schools system and its impacts.
Released in 2015, the TRC report added an important chapter to the redefinition of the
Indigenous/non-Indigenous relationship in Canada, prompting some necessary conversations. A
Symposium on Reconciliation in Ontario reported that:
Reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada is not just
about the legacy of residential schools. It is a multi-faceted process that restores
lands, economic self-sufficiency, and political jurisdiction to First Nations, and
develops respectful and just relationships between First Nations and Canada.86
The TRC Calls to Action offer a number of methods for engagement by Canada’s political and
legal institutions. Included in the TRC’s recommendations is the framework for promoting
reconciliation provided by international law, specifically the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).87

II. THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Canada was slow to ratify this comprehensive instrument adopted by the General Assembly in
2007, despite having had an active role in its drafting over a period of a couple of decades.
Indeed, Canada was one of four states (the others being Australia, New Zealand and the United
States) that opposed its adoption by the General Assembly. Eventually all four nations relented
in their opposition to endorsing UNDRIP, but generally offered a qualified endorsement, noting
its non-binding and “aspirational” character, as illustrated by Canada’s November 2010 press
release:
Although the Declaration is a non-legally binding document that does not reflect
customary international law nor change Canadian laws, our endorsement gives us the
opportunity to reiterate our commitment to continue working in partnership with
Aboriginal peoples in creating a better Canada.88
International law is often viewed as persuasive but not determinative in Canadian courts
and it is clear that the current Canadian government will seek to limit any application of this
84
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most important international law instrument for Indigenous peoples. The Harper government was
careful to note in the press release that UNDRIP “is a non-legally binding document that does
not reflect customary international law nor change Canadian laws.”89 It further took the
opportunity to reiterate:
Canada placed on record its concerns with various provisions of the Declaration,
including provisions dealing with lands, territories and resources; free, prior and
informed consent when used as a veto; self-government without recognition of the
importance of negotiations; intellectual property; military issues; and the need to
achieve an appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of Indigenous
peoples, States and third parties. These concerns are well known and remain.90
Notwithstanding the government’s stated concerns with UNDRIP, the TRC called upon
“federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal governments to fully adopt and implement
[UNDRIP] as the framework for reconciliation.”91 Further, the TRC called upon the federal
government “to develop a national action plan, strategies, and other concrete measures to achieve
the goals of [UNDRIP].”92 These recommendations are the leading statements in the section of
the TRC’s recommendations entitled “Reconciliation.” Following this, the TRC also urges the
government to jointly develop a new Royal Proclamation of Reconciliation with Aboriginal
peoples. The TRC also asserts that the new Royal Proclamation must:
i.
ii.
iii.

iv.

Repudiate concepts used to justify European sovereignty over Indigenous lands and
peoples such as the Doctrine of Discovery and terra nullius.
Adopt and implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples as the framework for reconciliation.
Renew or establish Treaty relationships based on principles of mutual recognition,
mutual respect, and shared responsibility for maintaining those relationships into the
future.
Reconcile Aboriginal and Crown constitutional and legal orders to ensure that
Aboriginal peoples are full partners in Confederation, including the recognition and
integration of Indigenous laws and legal traditions in negotiation and implementation
processes involving Treaties, land claims, and other constructive agreements.93

The Trudeau government initially stated that it would seek to comply with UNDRIP, but
has since retreated from that position.94 The government’s reluctance to adopt UNDRIP’s
recognition of inherent Indigenous rights and the TRC’s confidence that UNDRIP offers the
framework for reconciliation provide a starkly contrasting view of the way forward for the
Indigenous/non-Indigenous relationship in Canada. The contrasting conceptions of reconciliation
held by the Court and the TRC act as a metaphor for the difficulty with the Canadian situation—
the two visions are based on fundamentally different narratives, worldviews, and mythologies.
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One assumes dominance of the Canadian state while the other assumes resurgence of Indigenous
cultures, nationhood, and sovereignty as evidenced by the Idle No More movement, and the
increasing prominence of Indigenous voices in scholarship, politics and the arts.

III. A SHIFT IN NARRATIVE IS NEEDED
Although there is some illustration (if not acknowledgement) of the differing conceptions in the
general rhetoric regarding preference for negotiation/treaties over litigation/courts, the
Tsilhqot’in case shows that the conceptions are in fact irreconcilable. That is, you cannot
reconcile if your assertion of sovereignty continues to be challenged from the outset, as
Indigenous sovereignty is challenged by the Canadian state in its court arguments; and you
cannot assert sovereignty and “underlying” Crown title where no evidence of conquering exists.
Until the narrative shifts from the colonial constructs that enable the Canadian state to continue
to benefit from its presumed ownership of the lands and all their wealth here, reconciliation
cannot occur. This is why Indigenous voices such as Alfred prefer to discuss restitution rather
than reconciliation.95
The narrative shift that is required must come from a broader societal dialogue. While
flawed, the Court’s references to reconciliation can contribute to this shift, along with processes
such as commissions of inquiry and the TRC. This sort of change is slow in coming because it
requires people, especially non-Indigenous people, to take a hard look at ourselves and our
history and try to reflect honestly upon how we have built our society. Taking responsibility for
how we have benefited from the mass human rights violations committed in our past is not easily
done. However, as the RCAP report stated:
It is true, as Tom Siddon, a former minister of Indian affairs, has observed, that there
can be no real change within the confines of the Indian Act. However, it is equally
true that even if the Indian Act were repealed, there could be no real change without
repeal of the attitudes and assumptions that have made legislation like the Indian Act
and its precursors possible. A royal commission cannot make laws. It can inform and
recommend, however. In that role, we can call attention to the factors, attitudes and
continuing assumptions that brought about the Indian Act and that continue to
prevent progress in moving away from the restrictive Indian Act vision.
Those factors are to be found in past assumptions and the shadows they have cast on
present attitudes. They must be recognized for what they are and cast away as the
useless legacy of destructive doctrines that are as inappropriate now as they were
when first conceived.96
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Usually truth commissions are mechanisms of transitional justice and it is generally
thought that established democracies are non-transitional states. However, just as I argue that we
need to disrupt the national narratives in which Canada is identified as a human rights defender, I
argue that we must also rethink the idea of transitional justice. It is a measure of the western
liberal bias of much transitional justice literature that established democracies are described as
non-transitional. From the perspective of the peoples who have been oppressed by these
democracies, this may not be the case.97 Canada has waged a consistent and comprehensive
attack upon the legal and political institutions of Indigenous peoples since prior to
Confederation.98 It is only in the last half century that First Nations have been able to reassert
their voices and rebuild their societies.99 Indigenous peoples are in a period of transition,
therefore transitional justice mechanisms may be entirely appropriate for their passage into
renewed sovereignty.
In addition to the idea that Indigenous legal institutions in Canada are transitional, many
Indigenous communities question the legitimacy of Canada’s governance over them. They argue
that under international law, no government can be imposed upon a people without their consent;
this would be a denial of their right of self-determination.100 They argue that they never
consented to be governed by the French, the British, the Americans or anyone else, and
furthermore they were not conquered. As noted by Kennedy:
To establish respectful relations with Indigenous legal orders, Canadian law must
renounce its previous attempts to deny the existence, relevance, and legitimacy of
Indigenous law. It must acknowledge that such laws exist within dynamic legal
orders that continue to operate in Indigenous communities. It must also recognize
that these laws are integral to understanding what constitutes respectful relations
between Indigenous and Canadian legal orders.101
The term “reconciliation” in the transitional justice literature is problematic in the
Canadian context, since it implies that the parties were once whole, experienced a rift, and now
must be made whole again. In colonial settings such as Canada, this is not the case. The
relationship between Indigenous and settler peoples in Canada was one of nations encountering
nations, where one gradually oppressed and marginalized the other. Indigenous peoples never
agreed to the denial of their sovereignty, cultures or identities.102 Indeed, as noted by Chief
Justice McLachlin in Haida Nation: “Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when
Europeans came, and were never conquered.” Yet this statement by the Chief Justice is not
representative of how the larger Canadian population views their history, and nor does it
ultimately ground the Court’s conception of reconciliation.
97

Thanks to Dawnis Kennedy for our discussion on this point.
See Law Commission of Canada. Justice Within: Indigenous Legal Traditions. Discussion Paper, August 2006, at
11:
In spite of the importance of Indigenous laws in regulating the lives and affairs of Aboriginal peoples, their
influence was greatly eroded following the enactment of the Enfranchisement Act of 1869 and the Indian Act
in 1876, embodying a policy of assimilation and imposing a foreign system of governance and laws.
99
Ibid at 12: “Many Aboriginal communities today are actively revitalizing their legal traditions.” See also Law
Commission of Canada, ed, Indigenous Legal Traditions (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).
100
RCAP Report, supra note 4, Vol. 2, “Restructuring the Relationship,” chapter 1, section 2 “Governance.”
101
Kennedy, supra note 40 at 80.
102
Haida Nation, supra note 41 at para 25.
98

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol26/iss1/2

40

Stanton: Reconciling Reconciliation: Differing Conceptions of the Supreme

IV. CONCLUSION
As I have argued in the past, the TRC follows from a long list of Canadian commissions of
inquiry that have each assisted with the development of increased understanding of the
Indigenous and non-Indigenous relationship in Canada.103 Some of these commissions (Marshall,
Stonechild, Ipperwash) have had more direct impact on the court’s treatment of Indigenous
people with respect to criminal law. RCAP has arguably had an influence with respect to the
court’s treatment of Aboriginal title cases though the Court has not yet understood the underlying
premise of RCAP’s work. While it is too soon to measure any impact the TRC may have on the
courts, the TRC has the potential to contribute to a change in the narrative arc of Canada’s story:
Truth commissions are not so much concerned with the specifics of establishing the
legal and institutional framework for a new political order as they are in serving to
generate and consolidate new and distinctive conceptions of political morality that
can henceforth inform the political culture.104
As stated by Commissioner Sinclair:
A commitment to change will also call upon Canadians to realize that reconciliation
is not a new opportunity to convince Aboriginal people to “get over it” and become
like “everyone else.” That is, after all, what residential schools were all about and
look how that went.
It is an opportunity for everyone to see that change is needed on both sides and that
common ground must be found. We are, after all, talking about forging a new
relationship, and both sides have to have a say in how that relationship develops or it
isn’t going to be new.
Canada’s unilateral use of law to define and limit that relationship is a vessel that can
no longer hold water, so a discussion between equals must occur.105
The words of RCAP are once again applicable:
We now have an unprecedented opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the past
and to set out, both as governments and as peoples, in totally new directions. If
Canada has a meaningful role to play on the world stage … then it must first set its
domestic house in order and devise, with the full participation of the federal
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government, the provinces and the Aboriginal peoples, a national policy of
reconciliation and regeneration of which we can all be proud.106
Despite some positive developments with respect to non-Indigenous society beginning to
awake to our responsibility with respect to repairing the damage our country has wrought, there
are still considerable distances to travel toward an honest assessment of ourselves as a nation.
Regan’s disquiet on this is instructive:
At the heart of my misgivings was a growing realization that this reconciliation
discourse was actually a living testament to the ongoing dysfunction, violence,
denial, and unequal power that characterizes Indigenous-settler relations.107
It is our responsibility as non-Indigenous lawyers, scholars, and citizens to name myths
for what they are and to do our best not to compound the errors of our leadership. We must start
being more accurate and careful with our use of terminology whether making submissions to
courts, or writing opinion pieces, and scholarly articles. We must continue to urge our
professional and regulatory bodies, our universities, communities, municipalities, and provincial
and federal governments to adopt the TRC’s recommendations.108
While the TRC was forced to resort to the courts to seek enforcement of the Settlement
Agreement, it does not appear that the TRC has had a particular impact on jurisprudence as of
yet. It is possible that the TRC’s conception of reconciliation could inform jurisprudence
eventually. If some of the other TRC recommendations take hold, such as cultural competency
training for lawyers,109 and mandatory Aboriginal law courses in Canadian law schools, 110 we
may have a generation of legal counsel who not only use decolonialized language in making
their submissions but who eschew the courts altogether and make legitimate efforts to negotiate
with Indigenous peoples. The success of transitional justice processes cannot be measured in the
short term. They must be viewed in terms of their contribution to the changing of a nation’s
narrative about itself. Such change will never occur quickly enough but it must certainly occur if
reconciliation is to have any hope.
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